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Abstract
We analyze how Costa Rican coffee farmer’s behavior in an experimental public good game depends
on the type of mill where the farmers sell their coffee (Cooperative vs. privately owned mills), and on
the background of their game partners (partners selling to same type of mill or not). We find that
cooperative farmers do not display more public good orientation than private market farmers when
playing with partners from the same type of mill. However, while farmers selling to private mills make
no difference with respect to the background of partners, farmers selling to cooperatives significantly
decrease contributions when paired with non-cooperative members. Finally, we study how self-selection
into a mechanism that punishes the lowest contributors affects contributions both inside the group and
with partners of the opposite background, and show that this increases contributions in the games played
with farmers selling to different mill type.
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1 Introduction
Social interactions and trust among farmers have been documented as crucial for farmer’s well being and for
the design of support programs. For example, informal insurance mechanisms (Fafchamps and Lund, 2003;
Karlan et al., 2009), adoption of new farming techniques (Conley and Udry, 2010) or take-up of insurance
products (Karlan et al., 2014) have been shown to be closely related to information about and trust in
neighbor’s behavior.
We focus on the case of coffee, in which mill’s buying locations are focal for farmers’ social interactions
and two types of mill ownership coexist (privately owned and cooperatives). While cooperatives are often
viewed as institutional structures that enforce social and fair behavior, scientific evidence of the existence
of such effects is scarce. Through the analysis of contributions to an experimental public good performed
with coffee farmers in Costa Rica, we analyze how farmer’s behavior depends on the type of mill to which
they sell their coffee (cooperative vs. privately owned mills). We additionally vary the background of the
partners they are paired with in the game (partners selling to same vs. a different type of mill) and study how
self-selection into a mechanism that will punish the lowest contributors in the group affects contributions.
Specifically, we address the following general questions: (1) Do the two types of farmers react differently
when interacting with farmers selling to the same type of mill vs. the other type? and (2) In case a mechanism
could be established to punish free-riders, which group of farmers would be more willing to implement such
a mechanism, and how would it affect contributions? The answer to these questions allows us to analyze
whether belonging to a participatory institution (cooperative) has a differential effect on the contributions
inside the mill compared to farmers selling to private mills. Our main result is that farmers selling to
cooperative mills cooperate less with game partners that do not sell to a cooperative mill, and they respond
more to the introduction of control mechanisms.
Costa Rica is an good setting to answer these questions. Land distribution is quite homogeneous among
many small farmers, and historically the relationship of farmers with all types of mills has been peaceful
(Paige, 1997). The role of ICAFE, the coffee board, is to regulate the distribution of profits along the value
chain with no intervention on the farmer’s choice of where to deposit their cherries.1 We focus on behavior
by coffee farmers that are active members of a cooperative and contrast their choices to farmers that are
selling to the privately owned mills. The peculiarity of our sample is that almost all farmers have belonged
to a cooperative at some point in their lives, and for different circumstances (mainly financial failure of the
institution), part of them got involved in selling to the private sector. We acknowledge that the coexistence
1The coffee boards of other countries, for example Colombia, have strong relationship with cooperatives, using them as
implementing arms for many of the National programs. In Costa Rica, the relationship of the coffee board is equal for all types
of mills.
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of the two types of mills in the same areas raises selection issues into each type of mill.2 On the other hand,
this coexistence offers the possibility to study how the type of mill, farmers in a given area sell to, affects
behavior with farmers selling to either type of mill present in their community.
We structure the presentation of our results along three main parts: (1) Do the contributions to the public
good game differ between farmers belonging to the two types of mills when they play with partners selling
to the same type of mill? (2) What is the relationship between the groups, i.e. are contributions sensitive
to the background of the partners when farmers of different types are matched? and (3) In which settings
(which type of mill and against which partner’s background) will farmers be willing to add a mechanism to
the public good game that punishes free-riders and what will be their reaction to it when added? Finally,
as an external validity check, we study how cooperative farmers’ side-selling behavior and the cooperative
characteristics (fair trade label) are correlated with experimental contributions.
With respect to the first question, both cooperatives and privately owned mills offer farmers a forum of
interaction. The main difference between the two types of mills is that cooperatives provide an institutional
structure that allows its members to ‘cooperate’ for joint social or financial benefits. We find that contribu-
tions in a public good game played with partners from the same type of mill do not differ significantly across
the two types of mills. This result shows that the extra-involvement intrinsic to the cooperative structure
does not translate into more collaborative behavior.
When looking at the reaction to the background of partners, we find that cooperative farmers strongly
react to it, significantly decreasing contributions when paired with farmers selling to private mills. For private
market participants, on the other hand, we do not find significant reaction to the background of partners.
We hypothesize that this result may be due to a ‘negative stigma’ attached to private mills from the point
of view of cooperative farmers. This is supported by the fact that cooperative farmers reporting at least
some side-selling make a significantly smaller difference between the groups than cooperativists not reporting
side-selling.
After analyzing the behavior on the standard public good game, we offer participants the possibility to
introduce to the game a mechanism that penalizes free-riders. The role of this scheme is to implement a fee
on the lowest contributor to the game, and revert part of this fee to the common pool. We find that adoption
of this scheme is very high across groups and partners: from 93% for farmers selling to private mills when
matched with cooperativists to 73% for cooperative farmers playing with private market participants. While
the introduction of the scheme does not have a significant effect when matched with partners selling to the
same type of mill, its effect is large (increase of 3 contribution points over 10 feasible) when matched with
partners of a different background.
2This lack of zoning prevent us from using a discontinuity analysis as in Sukhtankar (2015).
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In an extension we discuss the external validity of abstract game behavior by correlating free-riding in the
abstract public good with real world side-selling. We further investigate whether members of cooperatives
that hold the Fair Trade label (introducing additional rules to the cooperatives) differ in abstract game
behavior. We find that side-selling has a negative effect on public good contributions and that farmers in
cooperatives holding the Fair Trade label contribute significantly less independently of the background of
their partners.
The paper contributes to several strands of the literature. First, cooperatives are a traditional cash crop
structure in developing countries and have been extensively studied. Banerjee et al. (2001) and Sukhtankar
(2012) have analyzed how land distribution and political pressure affects their governance structure and
outcomes for farmers, and Simmons and Birchall (2009) have focused on their lack of success in increasing well
being of rural poor. We add to this literature by checking how cooperatives may affect farmers’ collaborative
behavior, and cooperative farmer’s choice of institutional mechanisms in that context.
Second, the paper adds to the literature making use of experimental economics to measure cooperative
behavior and social capital (e.g. Karlan, 2005; Fehr and Leibbrand, 2011). Studies of in-group versus out-
group behavior suggest that contributions are higher when paired with participants from one’s own group than
with out-group members (Tajfel and Turner, 1979; Bernhard et al, 2006; Goette et al., 2006). Differences in
pro-sociality of different types of groups have also been investigated by Banuri and Keefer (2012), comparing
the behavior of government officials in Indonesia with private sector participants. Experimental work on
fishing cooperatives (Carpenter and Seki, 2011; Gelcich et al., 2012) show that special institutional structures
as pooling of fish and involvement of well organized unions, can increase contributions in laboratory settings.
Our contribution is to look at behavior related to interactions with the own vs. a different group, where
one of the groups is composed of farmers from cooperatives and the other of farmers selling to private mills.
Cooperatives add benefits (credit, supplies and public goods as health and education programs) but also costs
(assemblies, exclusivity restrictions on sales) to the social interactions taking place at mills. One limitation
of our setting, discussed at the end of this paper, is that we cannot control for selection into the two groups.
While this is a limitation, the coexistence of both types of mills at the same location is what allows us to
compare behavior of farmers with respect to own and the other type of mills.
Finally, we provide some insight related to the sustainability of both types of institutions. Indeed, side-
selling, even if it violates the cooperative’s exclusivity clause, is common, and has given raise to a growing
literature on loyalty of members to the cooperatives (e.g., Casaburi and Macchiavello, 2015). In our extension,
we study how farmers that declare to side-sell part of their production and the certifications of the institution
affect the farmers’ collaborative behavior.
The structure of the paper is as follows. In Section 2 we describe the setting in which the study was
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performed and the details of the sample. Section 3 presents the structure of the study. In Section 4,
we present the results. Section 5 presents extensions to analyze how real world behavior and cooperative
characteristics correlate with contributions. Section 6 concludes.
2 Background and Data
2.1 Coffee market in Costa Rica
Coffee is the third most important agricultural export product in Costa Rica, after bananas and pineapples.3
In Costa Rica, coffee commercialisation is at the hands of the private sector, with strong supervision by the
state through the Instituto del Cafe de Costa Rica (ICAFE).4
At the first stage of the coffee value chain, coffee farmers have the choice to bring their produce to any
mill with the constraint of bringing the cherries to the mill within twenty-four hours from collection. In all
districts (sub-locations) the farmers can go to two types of mills: privately owned and cooperatives. The
sales to both types of mills, with respect to payment terms and prices paid, are subject to identical ICAFE
regulations. However, cooperative mills have membership requirements as well as exclusivity clauses specific
to the cooperative institution.
Cooperativism is important in the Costa Rican culture and economy: 37% of the economically active
population is directly or indirectly related to a cooperative. From the estimated 52500 farmers growing coffee
in Costa Rica, 26881 are members of cooperatives, which represent 37% of the country’s production.5 As
presented in Paige (1997), cooperatives have historically had an important role on the coffee industry in
Costa Rica. All cooperatives have the same governance structure as regulated by the Costa Rica cooperative
laws. The internal regulation for each of the cooperatives establishes the roles and responsibilities of the
cooperative members. Among other, these regulations establish the obligation of members to bring all their
produce to the cooperative, and the vote and voice rights attached to cooperative membership. Cooperatives
offer their members multiple benefits, like credit for inputs and training in farming techniques.
2.2 Sample characteristics
We conducted our study with coffee producers selling to each type of mill: private and cooperative. The
mills where the study was performed are located at the high altitude mountains and valleys of the Tarrazu
3Coffee represented 16.62% of the agricultural exports in 2012, 12.55% in 2013 and 10.99% in 2014. Source: Promotora del
Comercio Exterior de Costa Rica, Estatisticas de Comercio Exterior.
4The ICAFE is regulated by the ’Ley 2762 del 21 de junio de 1961’. For more details, see: www.icafe.go.cr. On this
site, the ICAFE is defined as ‘una entidad pu´blica de cara´cter no estatal que promueve la actividad cafetalera nacional’(a
non-governemental public institution that promotes the national coffee activity).
5Sources: INFOCOOP, III Censo Nacional Cooperativo (2008) and Coocafe.
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region, and at the lower altitude volcanic region of Turrialba. The Tarrazu region, in Los Santos District,
represents 30% of the Costa Rican coffee production, and is the country’s most traditional coffee region, with
the majority of farmers not having alternative sources of income. The three cooperatives and one of the
private mills that we visited are located in the Tarrazu Region. The second private mill is located in the
Turrialba region. Detailed information about the different areas can be found in Appendix A. We observe
no major differences between the areas involved in this study concerning land tenancy or use. The selected
cooperatives and private mills are similar in terms of age and competition from other mills in the area. Two
of the three selected cooperatives were holding the Fair Trade label at the time of the study.
Farmers were contacted by the cooperative or private mill respectively, to ask their voluntary participation
in a scientific study. Response rates were approximately 70%. The study was run in groups of 15-20 farmers
at the cooperative meeting room and at adapted spaces at the private mills and lasted for approximately
2 hours. Average age of participants was 47 years and about 10% of participants were women. Summary
statistics of the participants can be found in Table 1.
Our aim is to compare the two groups in terms of behavior inside the group and with respect to the
other group. We analyze if belonging to a participatory institution (cooperative) has a differential effect on
the contributions inside the group compared to farmers selling to private mills. Common to both types of
group are the social interactions at the buying point but they differ with respect to the management of the
institution. An obvious concern when considering the two samples is that the two groups are not randomly
assigned. It needs to be noted that in all the locations where the study was performed there were buying
points of both types of mills. Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics for both samples. Farmers selling
to the private market are significantly younger and more likely to have other sources of income than coffee.
Farmers in both samples reported to know almost all the farmers selling to the same mill buying point. In
the post-experimental questionnaire, only 16% of the farmers selling to private mills reported to have never
been members of a cooperative. Farmers belong to small communities, where family and social interactions
are of great importance and the point of deposit for coffee is an important social and economic meeting point
that is not easily changed, especially for older generations.
3 Methods
The experimental part of the study had two parts, as summarized in Table 2. The protocol can be found in
Appendix B. All participants made choices with respect to four different incentivized choice tasks in which
they had to make decisions concerning contributions to an abstract public good option. Across the tasks we
varied the identity of the partners (either cooperative farmers or free market participants) and whether a
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control mechanism was available or not. No feedback was given between the tasks.
Hence, the first part of the game allows us to compare the contributions of participants depending on the
background of their partners. The second part of the game allows us to study, on the one hand, the decision
to introduce the control mechanism depending on the type of partners, and, on the other hand, the reaction
to this mechanism (when activated) depending on the background of the other players.
In total 86 farmers participated in the study. Cooperative farmers were members of three different
cooperatives (N=55) and private market participants were associated with two different private mills (N=31).
To maximize the number of independent observations, participants did not participate in a simultaneous
public good game but made individual decisions with respect to three hypothetical partners. Strategies of
partners were drawn from previous sessions and pre-tests. This gives us a total of 86 independent observations
concerning contributions to the public good.
Instructions were orally explained and a short written summary was provided (for the detailed protocol
see Appendix B). Given the age range (from 21 to 76 years old) and education level of participants, great care
was taken that all participants understood the decision situation and could answer control questions. It was
clearly explained that all decisions were anonymous and participants received an identifying code that was
linked to their decisions. It was further stressed that experimental units would be exchanged for real money
at the end of the session.6 After the decision task, participants where requested to fill out a questionnaire
on personal information. At the end of the session all decisions were payed out to participants and average
total earnings represented approximately a half-day labor salary for participants (3270 colones7).
3.1 Abstract public good task without control mechanism
Participants were presented with an incentivized questionnaire to elicit behavior in a public good type choice
situation. The questionnaire format was used due to logistic constraints, not allowing for a proper experimen-
tal setup. Recent research has indeed confirmed that answers to hypothetical experimental scenarios are the
best predictors of actual game behavior (Falk et al., 2015). Since answers to our incentivized questionnaire
were not purely hypothetical but earnings were based on own choices, we expect answers to be even further
correlated with true game behavior.
The study had two parts, as summarized in Table 2. The first part consisted of an anonymous choice task
concerning investment into an abstract public good. Participants made their individual decisions and were
informed that total public good production would be determined by their own choices and the strategies of
three other players that had previously participated in the game.8
6Each experimental unit was worth 50 colones.
7At the moment of the study, the exchange rate was 500 colones = 1 US dollar.
8The study consisted of five sessions conducted in the three different cooperatives and the two private mills. For each session,
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Each participant received an initial endowment of 10 monetary units and had to decide how many of these
to transfer to a group envelope (xi ∈{0,10}). Each unit transferred to the group envelope was multiplied by
1.5 by the experimenters and the individual received 1/4th of the group envelope. The payoff function for
the participant was therefore:
pii = (10− xi) + 1.5
4
∗ (
∑
xj)
Since individual payoffs are higher if all monetary units are kept in the private envelope, own payoff max-
imizing individuals should never transfer units to the group envelope.9 The task was presented in neutral
and abstract terms. Each farmer received two envelopes: one labeled ‘personal envelope’ with ten monetary
units (wooden ice-cream sticks) and one empty envelope labeled ‘group envelope’. Each participant had to
decide how many monetary units to transfer from one envelope to the other.
Participants made decisions on two different situations in relation to the origin of the three group members
who’s strategies they were matched with. Strategies came either from (i) farmers being members of a
cooperative or (ii) farmers that sell to private mills. In an in-subject design we can therefore compare
behavior when paired with farmers that shared the same background or with farmers that belong to the
other group.10 Envelopes concerning the different situations were color coded to avoid any confusion and
collected by the experimenters at the end of each game. No feedback about behavior of others was given
during the session.
The Nash equilibrium in the two games is independent of the background of the partners: it is always
optimal to keep all the points in the individual envelope. Hence, when analyzing the differences between
them we can study the different beliefs about behavior of partners of different backgrounds, and the effect of
belonging to each of the groups. This exercise will allow us to analyze the cohesion inside each of the groups,
cooperative and private, and their reaction to playing with partners with a different background.
3.2 Abstract public good task with control mechanism
In the second part we study the impact of a control mechanism that penalizes free riding and redistributes
part of the collected fines to the group.11 Participants were informed that they would have to make the same
decisions as in the first part; however for each game they could decide whether to add a control mechanism
strategies from previous sessions were selected and participants were shown the envelopes by these participants to remind them
that these were strategies previously played. For the first session strategies from previous pilots were used.
9Typical results on public good experiments consist of contributions between 40% and 60% in one-shot games, and of a
decrease of contributions to the Nash prediction of zero public good contribution in repeated games (for details see Ledyard,
1995 and Chaudhuri, 2011).
10As a control we also included a game played with the farmers present in the same session (i.e. that share the same background
and were also identifiable). Data from this control game is not further discussed in this paper.
11A large literature in experimental economics has investigated the effects of central taxation of free riders (e.g. Falkinger et
al., 2000) and decentralized punishment (e.g. Fehr and Gaechter, 2000)
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to the game and hence be paired with three other individuals that also had chosen to add such a mechanism.
Participants that added the control mechanism had to pay a monetary cost of one point per game. The
control mechanism was such that participants contributing less than the average of their group would loose
some of their monetary units. To limit efficiency losses due to control, 1/4th of the collected fees were added
to the public good envelope, the rest was returned to the experimenter. Implemented penalties differed across
participants and were based on randomly drawn punishment strategies from previous pilot sessions. Since
we wanted to study the general reaction to control, independent of knowing whether it would render free
riding unprofitable, the precise penalty amount was held ambiguous and participants were informed that the
mechanism was based on previous control decisions by other participants. Participants were informed that
penalties would be proportional to their deviation from average contributions in the group.
This exercise will allow us to answer two questions: (1) in which situation concerning partners background
are the participants more willing to activate the control mechanism? And, once control is activated, (2) in
which situation does the control mechanism have a greater effect on contributions? And how does the answer
to these questions vary for the two groups considered? The answer to the first question gives us a measure
on the belief of the participant on the other players willingness to free ride, and the willingness to pay a
cost to ensure other partners will have incentives to contribute. The answer to the second question gives
a measure of how players act differently when they know free riding by others will be punished, and when
they know they are playing with partners (whatever their background is) that also choose to introduce a
control mechanism on the game. We will look both at how reaction to control depends on the group where
the participants belong and to their previous experience with control mechanisms.
4 Results
We present the results following the structure of the experimental sessions. We start by analyzing the results
of the public good games played with different partners’ background. We continue presenting the results on
the willingness to activate the control mechanism by each of the groups with respect to the different game
partners, and conclude the results section with the reaction to the activation of the control mechanism on
the different games played.
In the extension section, we discuss the external validity of the results by looking deeper into the cooper-
ative participants behavior. We look at how real life behavior (’side selling’) and cooperative characteristics
(labels) affect their contributions and reaction to the control mechanism.
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Figure 1: Contributions in public good scenario dependent on background of partners.
4.1 Reactions to partners’ background
We start presenting how choices in the public good task are influenced by the pool from which are drawn the
strategies of the three interaction partners. Cooperativists interacted either with other, unknown coopera-
tivists or with farmers selling to private mills. We can compare this to behavior by free market participants
being paired with either cooperative members or other private mill participants.
In Figure 1 we present the average contributions for each of the four games: cooperative and private mills
farmers playing with their own or other background partners. Contributions to the public good when playing
with participants of one’s own type were 65% for cooperativists (N=55) and 56% for farmers selling to private
mills (N=31), and were not statistically different (see Figure 1, Wilcoxon test, p=0.1419).12 Contributions
when playing with participants from the other group were 30% for cooperativists and 56% for farmers selling
to private mills. Contributions by cooperativists strongly decreased when being paired with private mill
participants (Wilcoxon test, p=0.000).
Result 1: In the games played with own background partners there are no significant differences
across the two groups. In the games played with partners from the other group, contributions
significantly decrease for cooperative farmers while are very similar for the private mills partici-
pants.
We present in Table 3 the result of the estimation of the determinants of the contributions to each of the
games. We will estimate
cib = α+ β ∗ PartnersBackgroundb + γ ∗MillTypei ∗ PartnersBackgroundb + δ ∗Xi + εib (1)
12To ensure that participants understood the difference between being matched with participants that share the same back-
ground and participants that are identifiable, as shown in the order of tasks presented in Table 2, a first game was played
with participants that were participating in the same session. That were therefore identifiable and from the same background.
Contributions in this game were 54% for cooperativists and 54% for private market participants.
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where cib represents contribution of individual i to the game played with own or other partners background,
and Xi is a vector of individual characteristics.
We see in Column (1) of Table 3 that there is a negative and significant effect of playing with partners
of a different background, but from columns (2) to (5) we see that this result is driven by the cooperative
farmers group. Cooperative farmers contribute in both games more than farmers selling to private mills, but
they do contribute significantly less when the background of the partners is different from their own.
The reaction by cooperative farmers also indicates that members of cooperatives can not be categorized
as ‘generally’ more willing to contribute to the public good. The hypothesis that both institutions provide a
center of interaction among the farmers seems supported by the fact of non-different contributions towards
the own group in both cases. In contrast, farmers selling to the private mills were not influenced in their
behavior by the background of their partners.
Recall that cooperativists have generally always been members of a cooperative and only 31% of them have
occasionally sold to a private mill (another 30% report having sold to other cooperatives). Thus cooperativists
have in general had very limited interactions with farmers selling to private mills. In contrast only 16% of
private mills participants have never been part of a cooperative. The previous result thus suggests that
having had previous exposure to other deposit structure influences game behavior. This is confirmed when
comparing contributions by farmers (both private and cooperative) that have previously sold coffee to another
sort of deposit structure to those that never did. We find that the average contribution when paired with
participants from the other structure is 47% for farmers that have sold to other structures (N=43) versus
31% for farmers that have never done so (N=43) (Wilcoxon test, p=0.012). We discuss side-selling further
in the extensions.
As robustness tests, in Table 4 we present the results clustering the standard errors at the mill level, and the
interaction of the treatment (playing with different background partners) with two individual characteristics.
We see that the interaction of the treatment with age and alternative sources of income is not robustly
significant. These where the two individual characteristics were the samples of participants in both types of
mill differed, hence we can interpret it as a test of the results being driven by the institutional characteristics
of the cooperatives and not by individual characteristics.
4.2 Introducing external control
In the second part of the study, farmers were informed that they would make decisions concerning the same
situations as encountered in the first part but that they would have the possibility to self-select into groups
that either have or do not have an impartial control mechanism. This mechanism would penalize free riding
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Figure 2: Decision to choose control mechanism by cooperative and private market participants dependent
on background of partners.
and would redistribute part of the collected fines but had a cost to be paid by each of the farmers who decide
to add the mechanism. Figure 2 shows the proportion of participants opting for the control mechanism. 83%
of cooperativists opt for control when playing with other cooperativists, while 72% do so when paired with
private mills participants. Cooperativists choose control less often than the private mills participants.
A concern at this point is how participants self-select into the treatment with the control mechanism. We
first check whether participants that choose to introduce the control made significantly different contributions
in the first games, and we can reject this being the case (Wilcoxon p=0.64 for own group and p=0.1281 other
group, no significant effect for cooperative or private mill sellers). The only individual characteristic related
to selection into control for the cooperativists when playing with sellers to private mills is their previous
experience with private mills: cooperativist that reports to have sold coffee to private mills choose less often
control when matched with private mills participants (Wilcoxon p=0.059).
Although control is almost equally often chosen by cooperativists and by private mill participants, the
effect of control on behavior in the abstract public good is significantly different for the two groups. Figure 3
shows contributions in the second part of the study when control was available and as reference we also include
contribution levels from the games played when no control was available. We only consider participants
that chose to add control in the second part. We see that the insurance against free riders by control has a
significant effect on contributions by cooperativists, both when playing with their own type and when playing
with private mills participants. The increase in contributions when playing with their own type is about 10%,
and the increase when playing with private mill participants is more than 100%. In contrast control has no
effect on contributions by private mill participants. We therefore observe the following:
Result 2: Introducing an institution that would punish free riding increases contributions by
cooperativists when paired with both cooperativists and with private mill participants.
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Figure 3: Contributions to Public Good when control mechanism is chosen
We proceed now to study how the control mechanism increases contributions for each of the possible
partners’ background. We estimate, for the games played with own and with other group partners,
cib = α+ β ∗ ControlActiveb + γ ∗MillTypei ∗ ControlActiveb + δ ∗Xi + εib (2)
where cib represents contribution of individual i to the game played with and without control, and Xi is a
vector of individual characteristics.
Table 5 shows the results from this estimation. We find that, when playing with own group, the intro-
duction of a control does not have a significant effect on the contributions, and this effect is the same for
both types of farmers. However, when playing with the opposite group, the introduction of the control has
a significant positive effect, that is even greater for the cooperative farmers.
cibc = α+β1∗PartnersBackgroundb+β2∗ControlActivec+β3∗PartnersBackgroundb∗ControlActivec+
+ γ1 ∗Xi ∗ PartnersBackgroundb + γ2 ∗Xi ∗ ControlActivec + δ ∗Xi + εit (3)
where cibc represents contribution of individual i to the game played with background partners b (own vs.
other group) and with control c (not activated or activated), and Xi is a vector of individual characteristics.
In Column (1) of Table 6 we see that the introduction of a control mechanism has a positive and significant
effect on contributions, while the fact of playing with partners from the other group has a negative and
significant effect. In Columns (2) to (5) we see that the interaction term between partners’ background and
control is positive and significant: the increase in contributions is greatest when control is introduced in the
game played with the opposite group. In Columns (6) to (8) we show that this effect is mainly driven by the
13
farmers selling to a cooperative mill. We proceed with a more detailed analysis of the farmers selling to a
cooperative mill in the following section.
5 Extension: Real world behavior and Cooperative’s institutional
characteristics
In this section we analyze how the cooperative’s institutional characteristics and the farmer’s real world
behavior relate to choices made in the lab. We exclusively focus on farmers that are members of a cooperative
(N=55), recognizing that this is a rather small sample.
Cooperativists face a real world free-riding problem: financial and technical assistance from the cooper-
ative are guaranteed by membership independently of the production and hence of the contribution to the
institution. Cooperative members therefore have the possibility to benefit from the ‘common services’ while
side-selling part or all their high quality harvest to the free market for higher prices.13 Side-selling is against
cooperative rules, but punishment is very rare.
The question we would like to answer in the following, is whether self-reported side-selling is correlated
with abstract public good contributions.14 We use self reports by participants concerning whether they have
previously sold to mills different from their own cooperative: 61% of the cooperative farmers admit to have
sold coffee out of their own cooperative (either to other cooperatives or private mills), and 31% have sold to
private mills.15
We investigate the relationship between self reported behavior and behavior in the abstract public good
situation. Specifically we estimate the effect of the control mechanism for the sample of cooperative farmers
when playing with other cooperativist or with private market farmers, while interacting the presence of the
control mechanism with self-reported side-selling. Results are presented in Table 7. We find that side-selling
has a negative effect for the contributions inside the cooperative group. However the control mechanism
13Side-selling might be an indication that farmers try to maximize their own monetary earnings, but might also be elicited
by previous negative experience i.e. the observation of side-selling by others. We asked participants about their beliefs on the
behavior of other cooperative members, and all participants without exception answered that they believe there are cooperative
farmers that sell part of their production to the private market. As reasons they stated higher prices and the instantaneous
payment received from private mills.
14For general reviews on laboratory public good games see Ledyard, 1995 and Chaudhuri, 2011. Studies confirming a rela-
tionship between abstract social dilemmas and real world free riding investigated: investment in soil and water conservation in
India (Bouma et al, 2008); forest management outcomes in Ethiopia (Rustagi et al., 2010); type of fishing nets used in Brazil
(Fehr and Leibbrandt, 2011); the pooling of catch for shrimp fishers in Japan (Carpenter and Seki, 2011); fishing cooperatives
in Chile (Gelcich et. al., 2012). Others fail to observe such relationships: e.g. concerning forest management in Sierra Leone
(Voors et al., 2011) and concerning community investment in rural Sierra Leone (Voors et al, 2012).
15We validated self reports by crossing them with information provided by the cooperative on harvests from previous years,
specifically the ratio of bad (i.e. unripe) versus good coffee for the last two years prior to the present study. Selling part of
one’s good coffee to the private market will increase the percentage of unripe coffee delivered to the cooperative. Self reported
cheaters show a 0.8 percent increase in unripe coffee over the last two years, while others show only an increase of 0.03 percent.
This difference is statistically significant (Wilcoxon test, p = 0.089) and rather large given the ICAFE limit of 3% for unripe
coffee.
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increases contributions of this side-selling group mainly when playing with private market participants.
While all cooperatives share by law the same regulation with respect to the rights and responsibilities
of members, labels may have an additional effect on the dynamics inside the institution. We center on the
most common label for coffee cooperatives: Fair Trade.16 The Fair Trade label has costs, in terms of rules to
be followed (e.g. labor or environmental conditions) and benefits (e.g. primes distributed at the cooperative
assembly). It needs to be noted thought that the Fair Trade certification has norms that are loosely defined,
which generally apply to the cooperative as a whole. Individual punishment is thus not possible and non-
compliance rarely penalized. We hypothesize that farmers exposed to the Fair Trade certification might have
had negative experiences with respect to rule implementation, namely that rules can be easily bent and that
individual behavior does not lead to penalties.
We concentrate on farmers belonging to cooperatives holding the Fair Trade label. We find that these
farmers contribute significantly less independently of the background of their partner, but show no significant
difference with respect to the control mechanism (Table 8). Unfortunately our data does not allow us to
answer whether this indicates causation or is due to the self selection of certain cooperatives into the label.
6 Conclusion
While cooperatives are often viewed as institutional structures that enforce social and fair behavior, scientific
evidence of the existence of such effects is scarce. In this study we investigated behavior in an abstract,
laboratory public good situation, contrasting in particular the contributions of cooperative members to the
behavior of farmers selling to private mills when paired with members of their own group versus members
of different background. Our results show that members of a cooperative do not cooperate more when
paired with their own type compared to free market participants. By contrast cooperative members show
high distrust concerning free market participants. Thus we find no evidence that cooperative members are
generally more cooperative in an abstract, anonymous dilemma. We further find evidence that cooperative
members would be willing to cooperate more in such games if free riding would be penalized through some
independent authority. This result is in line with findings by Gelcich et al. (2012) that show that especially
members of fishing unions that have rather low performance profit from an external control mechanism. This
stresses the importance of well defined and functional control mechanisms to prevent deterioration of beliefs
in cooperatives. Our findings hint that collaborative behavior among farmers selling to a mill is independent
16The literature has so far failed to establish a clear positive effect of the Fair Trade certification. See for example Ronchi
(2006), Philpott et. al. (2007), Arnould et.al. (2009), Pay (2009) and Blackman and Rivera (2010) for surveys; and Becchetti
and Constantino (2006), Calo and Wise (2005) and Wollni and Zeller (2007) for case studies. Dragusanu and Nunn (2013) link
Costa Rican household data to certifications and find no evidence that the majority of workers benefit from holding the Fair
Trade certificate.
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of the type of mill to which they sell. But it is found that cooperative mill participants do have a significantly
lower collaborative behavior when paired with private mill farmers, while private mill farmers do not make
a difference between the different types of farmers.
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Table 1: Summary statistics of participants
All C1 C2 C3 All P1 P2 Diff ttest (p value)
55 15 20 20 31 13 18
44 54 40 40 53 55 51 -9 3.21 (0.00)
9% 13% 0% 15% 10% 15% 5% -1% 0.09 (0.93)
98% 93% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% -2% 0.46 (0.75)
72% 60% 75% 80% 51% 61% 44% 21% 2.00 (0.05)
Primary 64% 60% 55% 75% 77% 69% 83% -13% 1.32 (0.19)
Secondary 13% 20% 15% 5% 6% 8% 6% 7%  -0.91 (0.37)
Technical/Professional Studies 18% 20% 25% 10% 6% 0% 11% 12% 1.51 (0.13)
University 5% 0% 5% 10% 10% 23% 0% -5% 0.73 (0.47)
68% 60% 65% 75% 26% 24% 28% 42% 3.98 (0.00)
88% 89% 78% 94% 81% 62% 94% 7% 0.84 (0.40)
85.20 64.16 99.22 143.54 158.66 225.89 49.26 -58.34 2.03 (0.05)
Coffee unique source of income 
If not: Coffee represents at least half 
of family income
Coffee production 2010-2011 (in 
cajuelas*)
* one cajuelas is approximately equal to 4 pounds of roasted coffee
Cooperative mills Private mills
Observations
Average age
Female (percent)
Born in region or living there for 
many years 
Part of family is also in coffee 
business 
Education (percentages)
Table 2: Order of tasks during laboratory study
0.  game played with players in same session (results not discussed in this paper)
1.  hypothetical scenario with members of a cooperative
2.  hypothetical scenario with free market participants
Choice of control:
0. choice of control mechanism for game played with  participants in same session 
1. choice of control mechanism for hypothetical scenario with members of a cooperative
2. choice of control mechanism for hypothetical scenario with free market participants
Public good choices:
0. game played with players in same session (with or without control mechanism as chosen above)
1. hypothetical scenario with members of a cooperative (with or without control mechanism as chosen 
above)
2. hypothetical scenario with free market participants (with or without control mechanism as chosen 
above)
Final questionnaire
part 1: public good choices
part 2: control mechanism
Note: Order of events was the same in all sessions and no information on contributions was announced until the end 
of the experiment. 
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Table 3: Contributions to public good as function of background of others
Dependent variable: contribution to public good game out of 10 points
(1). (2). (3). (4). (5).
Treatment: -2.267*** 0 0 0 0
Other group members different background (0.434) (0.609) (0.614) (0.629) (0.861)
Cooperative member 0.951 1.478* 1.536** -0.727
(0.604) (0.749) (0.712) (0.563)
Treatment * Cooperative member -3.545*** -3.545*** -3.472*** -3.545***
(0.796) (0.803) (0.823) (1.126).
Constant 6.221*** 5.613*** 5.462*** 6.650*** 7.500***
(0.297) (0.471) (0.623) (1.357) (0.431)
Observations 172 172 172 168 172
Individual Ids 86 86 86 84 86
R-squared 0.143 0.241 0.247 0.257 0.638
Individual FE N N N N Y
Individual controls N N N Y N
Mill FE N N Y Y Y
Robust standard errors in parentheses (cluster individual):*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Individual controls: Age, gender, born in the town, other incomes than coffee, education.
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Table 4: Robustness checks for contributions in function of partners’ background
Robustness check 1: Mill cluster of std. errors.
Dependent variable: contribution to public good game out of 10 points
(1). (2). (3). (4). (5).
Treatment: -2.267* 0 0 0 0
Other group members different background (0.872) (0.103) (0.104) (0.106) (0.146)
Cooperative member 0.951* 1.478*** 1.536** -0.727*
(0.432) (0.238) (0.445) (0.333)
Treatment * Cooperative member -3.545*** -3.545*** -3.472*** -3.545***
(0.471) (0.476) (0.608) (0.667)
Constant 6.221*** 5.613*** 5.462*** 6.650*** 7.500***
(0.331) (0.153) (0.0519) -1207 (0.0728)
Observations 172 172 172 168 172
Individual Ids 86 86 86 84 86
R-squared 0.143 0.241 0.247 0.257 0.638
Individual FE N N N N Y
Individual controls N N N Y N
Mill FE N N Y Y Y
Robust standard errors in parentheses (cluster mill):*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Individual controls: Age, gender, born in the town, other incomes than coffee, education.
Robustness check 2: Effect of treatment not driven by individual characteristics  (income)
Dependent variable: contribution to public good game out of 10 points
(1). (2). (3). (4). (5). (6).
Treatment: -3.022*** -3.022*** -3.022*** -3.022** -3.022** -3022
Other group members different background (0.611) (0.618) (0.863) (0.063) (0.1076) (0.1503)
Other incomes than coffee -0.702 -1.109* -0.792 -0.702 -1109 -0.792
(0.592) (0.591) (0.603) (0.661) (0.565) (0.1033)
Treatment * Other incomes than coffee 1.583* 1.583* 1583 1583 1583 1583
(0.853) (0.864) (0.1207) (0.1461) (0.1479) (0.2066)
Constant 6.556*** 7.217*** 9.011*** 6.556*** 7.217*** 9.011***
(0.423) (0.656) (0.432) (0.586) (0.439) (0.752)
Observations 172 172 172 172 172 172
Individual Ids. 86 86 86 86 86 86
R-squared 0.161 0.186 0.575 0.161 0.186 0.575
Cluster Standard errors Ind. Ind. Ind. Mill Mill Mill
IndividualFE N N Y N N Y
Mill FE N Y Y N Y Y
Robust standard errors in parentheses:*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Robustness check 3: Effect of treatment not driven by individual characteristics  (age)
Dependent variable: contribution to public good game out of 10 points
(1). (2). (3). (4). (5). (6).
Treatment: -5.069*** -5.069*** -5.069** -5.069** -5.069** -5069
Other group members different background (0.1582) (0.1601) (0.2237) (0.1800) (0.1822) (0.2546)
Age -0.0253 -0.0423 -0.0472** -0.0253 -0.0423 -0.0472
(0.0262) (0.0277) (0.0234) (0.0255) (0.0284) (0.0235)
Treatment * Age 0.0610* 0.0610* 0.0610 0.0610 0.0610 0.0610
(0.0331) (0.0335) (0.0468) (0.0332) (0.0336) (0.0469)
Constant 7.420*** 8.648*** 10.93*** 7.420*** 8.648*** 10.93***
(0.1290) (0.1420) (0.1119) (0.1275) (0.1334) (0.1273)
Observations 168 168 168 168 168 168
Individual Ids. 84 84 84 84 84 84
R-squared 0.154 0.179 0.572 0.154 0.179 0.572
Cluster Standard errors Ind. Ind. Ind. Mill Mill Mill
IndividualFE N N Y N N Y
Mill FE N Y Y N Y Y
Robust standard errors in parentheses:*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 5: Contributions to public good when playing with (A) own group and (B) other group, dependent on
control being active
(A)
Dependent variable: contribution to public good game out of 10 points
(1). (2). (3). (4). (5). (6).
Treatment: 0.547 0.696 0.696 0.705 0.705 0.705
Introduction of control (0.336) (0.498) (0.503) (0.705) (0.530) (0.536)
Private mill -1 048 -1 654 -1.307*** -0.534 -1 371
(0.661) (1.052) (0.438) (0.651) (0.953)
Treatment * Private mill -0.385 -0.385 -0.385 -0.394 -0.394
(0.619) (0.626) (0.876) (0.649) (0.657)
Constant 6.160*** 6.565*** 7.152*** 9.652*** 7.959*** 9.764***
(0.331) (0.432) (0.665) (0.352) (1.509) (1.821)
Observations 150 150 150 150 146 146
Individual IDs 75 75 75 75 73 73
R-squared 0.009 0.055 0.065 0.745 0.092 0.117
Individual FE N N N Y N N
Individual controls N N N N Y Y
Mill FE N N Y Y N Y
(B) 
Dependent variable: contribution to public good game out of 10 points
(1). (2). (3). (4). (5). (6).
Treatment: 1.803*** 3*** 3*** 3*** 3.051*** 3.051***
Introduction of control (0.463) (0.622) (0.630) (0.880) (0.649) (0.657)
Private mill 2.340*** 2.321* 4.019*** 1.920** 1 924
(0.663) (1.222) (0.570) (0.854) (1.227)
Treatment * Private mill -3.038*** -3.038*** -3.038*** -3.090*** -3.090***
(0.806) (0.816) (1.140) (0.834) (0.844)
Constant 4.197*** 3.275*** 3.615*** 3.500*** 4.933*** 6.259***
(0.353) (0.422) (0.753) (0.440) (1.642) (2.221)
Observations 132 132 132 132 130 130
Individual IDs 66 66 66 66 65 65
R-squared 0.082 0.155 0.167 0.705 0.237 0.252
Individual FE N N N Y N N
Individual controls N N N N Y Y
Mill FE N N Y Y N Y
Robust standard errors in parentheses (cluster individual):*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Sample: participants that choose to include control when playing with own group
Individual controls: Age, gender, born in the town, other incomes than coffee, education.
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Table 6: Contributions to experimental public good
Dependent variable: contribution to public good game out of 10 points
Only Only All 
(1). (2). (3). (4). (5). private coop
With Control Mechanism 1.268*** 0.750** 0.750** 0.745** 0.750* 0.333 1.065* 0.333
(0.341) (0.349) (0.352) (0.363) (0.403) (0.413) (0.570) (0.402)
With Other group -1.089** -1.607*** -1.607*** -1.618*** -1.607** 0.250 -3.065*** 0.250
(0.426) (0.530) (0.535) (0.551) (0.612) (0.796) (0.674) (0.775)
Control * Other group 1.036** 1.036** 1.055** 1.036* -0.208 2.032*** -0.208
(0.493) (0.497) (0.512) (0.569) (0.642) (0.736) (0.625)
Cooperative members 1.170
(0.898)
Control * Coop. 0.731
(0.691)
Other group * Coop. -3.315***
(1.021)
Control * Other group * Coop 2.241**
(0.958)
Constant 5.545*** 5.804*** 5.836*** 9.341*** 8.920*** 7.869** 8.486*** 8.928***
(0.358) (0.386) (0.670) (1.922) (0.338) (3.012) (1.864) (1.858)
Observations 224 224 224 220 224 96 124 220
Individual Ids 56 56 56 55 56 24 31 55
R-squared 0.076 0.083 0.094 0.148 0.468 0.109 0.311 0.213
Individual FE N N N N Y N N N
Individual controls N N N Y N Y Y Y
Mill FE N N Y Y Y Y Y Y
Robust standard errors in parentheses (cluster individual):*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Individual controls: Age, gender, born in the town, other incomes than coffee, education.
All participants 
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Table 7: Contributions to public good of cooperative members, controlling for self reported side selling
behavior
Dependent variable: contribution to public good game out of 10 points
(1). (2). (3). (1). (2). (3).
Treatment: 0.696 0.333 0.333 3*** 0.308 0.308
Introduction of control (0.498) (0.740) -1 034 (0.622) (0.667) (0.931)
Side selling 0.243 -2.798*** -1 123 1.506**
-1 118 (0.705) (0.751) (0.707)
Treatment * Side selling 0.595 0.595 3.989*** 3.989***
-1 008 -1 409 -1 014 -1 415
Constant 6.565*** 6.207*** 8.333*** 3.275*** 4.176*** 3.346***
(0.432) -1 094 (0.517) (0.422) (0.601) (0.466)
Observations 92 92 92 80 80 80
Individual IDs 46 46 46 40 40 40
R-squared 0.015 0.038 0.671 0.203 0.304 0.742
Individual FE N N Y N N Y
Mill FE N Y Y N Y Y
Robust standard errors in parentheses (cluster individual) :*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Sample: Cooperative participants that choose to include control when playing with own/other group respectively
Individual controls: Age, gender, born in the town, other incomes than coffee, education,
reason to join cooperative, family in coffee, perception of implication in cooperative.
Cooperative partners Private market partners
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Table 8: Contributions to public good of cooperative members, controlling for cooperative having Fair Trade
certifications
Dependent variable: contribution to public good game out of 10 points
(1). (2). (3). (1). (2). (3).
Treatment: 0.696 0.167 0.167 3*** 4.846*** 4.846***
Introduction of control (0.498) (1.075). (1.512). (0.622) -1 147 -1 611
Fair Trade Cooperative -1 045 -2.358*** 1 252 -2.632***
(0.960) (0.855) -1 049 (0.941)
Treatment * Fair Trade 0.716 0.716 -2.735** -2 735
-1 215 -1 709 -1 340 -1 883
Constant 6.565*** 7.417*** 7.917*** 3.275*** 2.692*** 5.077***
(0.432) (0.705) (0.756) (0.422) (0.849) (0.805)
Observations 92 92 92 80 80 80
Individual IDs 46 46 46 40 40 40
R-squared 0.015 0.033 0.671 0.203 0.254 0.701
Individual FE N N Y N N Y
Location FE N Y Y N Y Y
Robust standard errors in parentheses (cluster individual):*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Sample: Cooperative participants that choose to include control when playing with own group
Individual controls: Age, gender, born in the town, other incomes than coffee, education,
reason to join cooperative, family in coffee, perception of implication in cooperative.
Cooperative partners Private market partners
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!Appendix!A:!Experimental!procedures!
!
Participants* were* recruited* by* announcements* from* their* cooperative* or* private* beneficio* to*
participate* in* a* scientific* study.* No* information* about* the* context* of* the* experiment* was* made*
available* before* hand.* Participants* were* received* in*meeting* rooms* of* their* cooperative* or* private*
beneficio*and*individually*seated.*Instructions*were*orally*explained*by*a*native*Spanish*speaker*and*
short* written* summaries* were* provided.* Contributions* to* either* the* private* or* public* good* were*
implemented*by*allocating*small*wooden*sticks*between*two*envelops*marked*private*or*public*good.*
Different*tasks*were*colour*coded*to*avoid*any*confusion.*
Upon*arrival,* participants*were*provided*with*a* random* identifier* that*allocated* them* to* their* seat.*
Each*seat*had*a*set*of*the*written*instructions.*To*ensure*understanding*instructions*were*read*aloud*
and* explained* in*great*detail* on*a* flipchart.* Participants*had* to*be*able* to* correctly* answer* control*
questions*to*proceed*with*the*study.**
To*ensure*the*understanding*of*the*game*structure,*in*each*part*participants*first*played*a*public*good*
game*with*other*participants*in*the*same*session*(results*of*this*game*are*not*discussed*in*this*paper).*
Then* the* two* hypothetical* decision* situations* were* presented.* In* these* situations* the* experimenter*
showed*the*envelops*containing*the*strategies*from*these*previous*sessions*to*ensure*that*participants*
understood*that*these*choices*were*already*taken.*
* * * * * * * * * * * * *
Written!summary!(translated!from!Spanish):*The!result!of! this!study!depends!on!your!decisions!and!on!the!decisions!of!3!other!participants! in!this!project.!You!will!never!know!the!identity!of!these!persons,!and!they!will!never!know!that!they!played!with!you.!All!of!you!will!be!taking!the!same!type!of!decisions.!!In!this!game!you!will!accumulate!a!number!of!points!that!at!the!end!will!be!exchanged!into!colones!with!the!equivalence!of!1!point!=!50!Colones.!!! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
!
Part!1:!
Game*0*–*with*participants*in*same*session:*Imagine!the!situation!where!you!are!playing!with!three!producers!in!this!room.!!You!did!receive!two!envelopes:!
• In!one!of! the!envelopes,! the! ‘Personal!Envelope’,! there!are!10!points.!These!points!are!yours.!
• The!other!envelope,!the!‘Group!Envelope’,!is!empty.!!!You!now!have!to!decide!how!many!of!your!10!points!you!want!to!transfer!to!the!‘Group!Envelope’.!What!happens!if!you!transfer!points!to!the!‘Group!Envelope’?!1. You!will!have!less!points!in!your!‘Personal!Envelope’,!but!!2. For!each!point!that!you!add!to!the!‘Group!Envelope’,!we!will!add!0.5!points.!!
For*example:**
! If* you* transfer* all* 10* points,* we*will* add* 5* points* and* there*will* be* 15* points* in* the* ‘Group*
Envelope’.*
! If*you*do*not*transfer*any*point,*we*will*not*add*anything*to*the*‘Group*Envelope’*!What!happens!with!the!points!in!the!‘Group!Envelope’?!
• The!points! in! the! ‘Group!Envelope’!will! be!distributed! equally! among! the!members! of! the!group,!including!yourself.!!!
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Example:*
! If* there* are* 20* points* in* the* ‘Group* Envelope’,* you* and* each* of* the* other* 3*members* of* the*
group*will*receive*5*points.!!!You!will!not!know!how!many!points!the!other!participants!did!transfer!to!the!‘Group!Envelope’,!and!the! other! participants! will! never! know! how! many! points! you! did! transfer.! All! participants! will!decided!how!many!points!to!transfer!before!knowing!the!choices!of!the!other!members!of!the!group.!!You!have!one!minute!to!transfer!the!number!of!points!you!want!from!one!envelope!to!the!other.!!When!done,!please!leave!the!envelopes!in!front!of!you.!!! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
*
Game*1*–*hypothetical*scenario*with*members*of*a*cooperative:*Now!let's!repeat!the!previous!situation!and!imagine!that!you!are!playing!with!three!producers!who!
belong!to!a!cooperative.!You!did!receive!two!envelopes:!
• In!one!of! the!envelopes,! the! ‘Personal!Envelope’,! there!are!10!points.!These!points!are!yours.!
• The!other!envelope,!the!‘Group!Envelope’,!is!empty.!!!You!now!have!to!decide!how!many!of!your!10!points!you!want!to!transfer!to!the!‘Group!Envelope’.!! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
*
Game*2*R*hypothetical*scenario*with*members*from*the*free*market:*Now!let's!repeat!the!previous!situation!and!imagine!that!you!are!playing!with!three!producers!who!
sell!to!the!private!market.!You!did!receive!two!envelopes:!
• In!one!of! the!envelopes,! the! ‘Personal!Envelope’,! there!are!10!points.!These!points!are!yours.!
• The!other!envelope,!the!‘Group!Envelope’,!is!empty.!!!You!now!have!to!decide!how!many!of!your!10!points!you!want!to!transfer!to!the!‘Group!Envelope’.!! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
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!
Part!2.!!Imagine!now!that! in! the!game!you! just!played!there! is! the!possibility! to!establish!a!Coordination!
System:! a! person! from! outside! the! group!will! be! able! to! decide!whether! to! penalize! the! players!depending!on!their!contribution!to!the!‘Group!Envelope’.!More! in! detail:! The! ‘Coordinator’! will! look! at! the! average! contribution! of! the! group,! and! he! will!establish! a! penalty! to! the! players! that! contributed! below! this! average.! In! other! words,! the!‘Coordinator’! will! charge! a! fee! from! the! players! that! contribute! relatively! little! but! received! the!benefits!from!other’s!effort.!The!fees!will!vary!with!the!distance!between!the!player’s!contribution!and!the!average!of!the!group.!!!For!example:!
*
**
*!!!!!!!
Contribution* 0* Average* Less*than*half*the*average*
Less*than*oneR
third*of*the*
average*
* *
*
2ª!Region!of!fees! 1ª!Region!of!fees!
*
Fees*
*
0*
*
*!To!have!a!‘Coordinator’!is!costly:!
• Each!member!of!the!group!has!to!pay!1!point!to!the!‘Coordinator’!for!his!work.!!
• The!‘Coordinator’!receives!the!payment!from!the!players!(4!points),!that!we!multiply!by!1.5!(!=!6!points),!and!has!to!return!¼!of!the!fees!to!the! ‘Group!Envelope’.! Imagine!now!that!you!are!the!coordinator!of!a!group!(Cooperative/Free!market):!!_____________________________________________________________________________!In!the!following!table,!state!the!contribution!to!the!‘Group!Envelope’!that!you!consider!minimal,!and!the!punishment!to!the!players!as!function!of!the!deviation!from!the!average.!!Minimal!contribution:!____!points.!!Player’s!contribution! 0! Average! Less!than!half!the!average! Less!than!onefthird!of!the!average!Fee! ! ! ! !!!! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
!
Average!1/2!average!1/3!average!
2nd!region!of!fees!1st!region!of!fees!! Region!without!fees!
! 26!
!
!
!Now!we!will!repeat!the!sequence!of!games!we!did!at!the!beginning,!but!before!that!we!give!you!the!possibility! to! choose! if! you!want!a! coordination!mechanism!of!not.!The! ‘Coordinator’,! in! case!you!choose!one,!will!be!a!private!market!seller/cooperativist.!The!presence!of!a!‘Coordinator’!has!a!cost!of!1!point,!which!will!be!paid!by!each!member!of!the!group.!!Do!you!want!to!add!a!Coordinator!(from!coop!/!free!market)!to!your!group!for!game!1!(with!producers!in!this!room)?!____!!Do!you!want!to!add!a!Coordinator!(from!coop!/!free!market)!to!your!group!for!game!2!(with!members!of!a!cooperative!producers)?!____!!Do!you!want!to!add!a!Coordinator!(from!coop!/!free!market)!to!your!group!for!game!3!(with!producers!selling!to!private!market)?!____!! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
*
Game*0*–*with*participants*from*same*session:*Imagine!now!the!situation!where!you're!playing!with!three!producers!in!this!room.!!•!Depending!on!your!response!to!the!previous!question,!a!coordinator!will!oversee!the!game.!!Please!decide!how!many!of!the!10!points!you!will!transfer!to!the!'Group!Envelop'.!Please!make!your!decision!now.!! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !!
Game*1*–*hypothetical*scenario*with*cooperative*farmers:*!Imagine!now!the!situation!where!you're!playing!with!three!producers!that!are!part!of!a!
coperative.!!•!Depending!on!your!response!to!the!previous!question,!a!coordinator!will!oversee!the!game.!!Please!decide!how!many!of!the!10!points!you!will!transfer!to!the!'Group!Envelop'.!Please!make!your!decision!now.!! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
*
Game*2*–*hypothetical*scenario*with*farmers*selling*to*free*market:**Imagine!now!the!situation!where!you're!playing!with!three!producers!that!are!selling!to!free!
market.!!•!Depending!on!your!response!to!the!previous!question,!a!coordinator!will!oversee!the!game.!!Please!decide!how!many!of!the!10!points!you!will!transfer!to!the!'Group!Envelop'.!Please!make!your!decision!now.!! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !!Thank!you!for!your!participation!!!!
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Appendix!B.!Tables!!Table!B1:!Summary!statistics!by!region!and!study!location!!
* *
Region:*Tarrazú* Region:*Turrialba*
! !
Total*for*region* Coop!1! Coop!2! Coop!3! Private!2! Total*for*region* Private!1!!
Number!of!'poligonos'! 4940* 366! 784! 735! 665! 1781* 1370!
Total!extension!(ha):! 33945* 2618! 6627! 5886! 3187! 27030* 17684!
Use!of!the!land:!
* ! ! ! ! * !
!
Coffee!! 63% 49% 64% 65% 43% 43% 45%
!
Yearly!crops! 1%* <!1%! <!1%! <!1%! 8%! 1%* 1%!
!
Permanent!crops! 1%* 1%! 1%! 1%! 2%! 15%* 11%!
!
Pasto!(grass!for!animals)! 15%* 16%! 16%! 7%! 24%! 14%* 16%!
!
Forest! 14%* 32%! 16%! 18%! 14%! 20%* 20%!
!
Other! 6%* 2%! 3%! 9%! 9%! 7%* 8%!
Principal!variety!of!coffee!planted:!
! Caturra! 87%* 57%! 81%! 90%! 89%! 89%* 88%!
! Catuai! 11%* 47%! 17%! 9%! 8%! 6%* 6%!
! Costa!RicaY95! <*1%* Y! <!1%! 1%! 1%! 2%* 2%!
! Other! <*1%* Y! Y! Y! Y! 3%* 4%!
Share!of!overall!coffee!planted!by!farmer's!age:!
! ! ! * !
!
15!to!24!years! 25%* 5%! 11% 20% 22% <*1% <!1%
!
25!to!59!years! 50%* 74%! 66%! 60%! 53%! 65%* 67%!
!
More!than!60!years! 23%* 25%! 22%! 18%! 25%! 3%* 24%!
Age!of!the!plantation:!
* ! ! ! ! * !
!
0Y9!years! 13% 14% 13% 20% 14% 19% 21%
!
10Y19!years! 40%* 35%! 38%! 38%! 46%! 44%* 43%!
!
20Y29!years! 22%* 17%! 28%! 20%! 17%! 23%* 24%!
!
30Y39!years! 8%* 13%! 9%! 5%! 8%! 9%* 8%!
!
40Y49!years! 4%* 6%! 3%! 2%! 4%! 3%* 2%!
!
more!than!50!years! 3%* 1%! 2%! 1%! 1%! 2%* 2%!
!
missing! 9%* 15%! 7%! 14%! 10%! 1%* 1%!
Type!of!fertilizer!(to!soil):!
* ! ! ! ! * !
!
Chemical! 92% 94% 97% 94% 88% 69% 72%
!
Organic! 2%* 2%! <!1%! <!1%! 4%! 5%* 6%!
!
Both! 6%* 4%! 2%! 5%! 8%! 26%* 21%!
!
missing! <*1%* Y! <!1%! <!1%! <!1%! <*1%* <!1%!
Land!tenancy!arrangement:!
! ! ! ! * !
!
Owned! 96%* 100% 100% 99% 98% 95% 94%
!
Rented! 4%* <!1%! <!1%! <!1%! 2%! 4%* 5%!
!
Borrowed! <*1%* <!1%! <!1%! <!1%! <!1%! <*1%* <!1%!
!
Other! <*1%* <!1%! Y! 1%! <!1%! <*1%* 1%!
Distribution!of!plots!by!size:!
! ! ! ! * !
!
less!than!1ha! 27%* 26% 10% 17% 26% 18% 19%
!
1!to!5!ha! 48%* 41%! 46%! 49%! 56%! 57%* 58%!
!
5!to!10!ha! 12%* 12%! 18%! 18%! 8%! 13%* 13%!
!
10!to!20!ha! 7%* 11%! 14%! 9%! 4%! 5%* 5%!
!
20!to!50!ha! 4%* 7%! 9%! 5%! 4%! 3%* 3%!
!
50!to!100!ha! 1%* 2%! 1%! 1%! 1%! 3%* 3%!
!
more!than!100!ha! 1%* 1%! 1%! 1%! 1%! E* Y!
Distributions'calculated'based'on'information'extracted'from'Censo'Cafetalero'Regiones'de'Turrialba'y'Coto'Brus'(2003)'and'
Regiones'de'Tarrazú,'Pérez'Zeledón'y'Zona'Norte'(2006).'Percentages'not'adding'up'to'100%'due'to'missing'observations.'!
